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I. INTRODUCTION

Fringe benefits have been increasing steadily as a percentage of tota
labor compensation in the U.S. since the 1940s, with the increase being
particularly rapid during the past twenty years [9, 11, 20] . Research efforts
to explain this phenomenon, however, have been limited. Rice discusses four

factors thought to be important in explaining the incidence and growth of
fringe benefits: (1) rising incomes, in combination with the preferential tax

treatment of benefits vis-a-vis cash wages; (2) the savings associated with

the group purchase of benefits; (3) the extent of unionization; and (4)
efforts to reduce labor turnover in the face of rising turnover costs [14] .
Subsequent research has been devoted largely to modeling and testing

empirically hypothesized relationships between the above factors and the
share of fringe benefits in total compensation. Freeman emphasizes the role
of unions [4] , while Long and Scott focus attention on the preferential tax
treatment of fringe benefits [11]. In a different approach, Woodbury uses
the translog indirect utility function to estimate that both the income elasticity of demand for fringes and the elasticity of substitution between wages

and fringes exceed unity [ 20] . The various studies utilize different data and
different variables and, as may be expected, do not always produce consistent results. On balance, however, they tend to support RiceTs original
hypotheses.

In a recent paper, Alpert adds a new dimension to this line of inquiry,
suggesting that product market power (proxied by the four firm concentra-

♦The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of
anonymous referees.
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tion ratio) also may play a role in explaining the fringe share and presenting

empirical results which support this view [2, 1]. These findings have a
number of interesting implications for research and public policy. For one
thing, numerous empirical studies have estimated the effects of concentration on wages, but ignore fringe benefits. If concentration affects fringes to

a relatively greater extent than it affects wages, as Alpertfs findings imply,
the effect of market power on total compensation has been understated in
such studies. Furthermore, an additional source of inefficiency would be
associated with the distortion of the wage fringe mix itself. Finally, since
the bulk of fringe benefits are given favorable tax treatment, Alpertfs find-

ings suggest that market power promotes a form of tax avoidance, raising
concerns about the efficiency and equity of our tax system.

There are, however, several reasons for regarding Alpertfs results as
tentative. First, his data on concentration, fringe benefits, and other variables come from different sources and are compiled in different ways,

raising possible concerns about data comparability. Second, his concentra-

tion variable is aggregated to the SIC three digit major industry level,
whereas the narrower four digit industry generally is considered to be the

most appropriate level of aggregation for measuring concentration and
market power [15]. Finally, Alpert follows the common practice of using
unadjusted Census concentration data, although it is widely recognized that

these data are subject to errors because (1) the SIC industry classifications

do not correspond always to meaningful economic markets and (2) the
compilation of these data on a national basis does not reflect always the

geographic scope of the market. Thus, additional tests clearly are warranted.

This paper provides further empirical evidence on the effects of market power on the fringe benefit share in total compensation. In light of the

potential problems mentioned above, Bureau of the Census four digit data
are used for all but one of the included variables and adjusted concentration

data are used in the multiple regression analysis of the fringe share. The
results provide important corroboration at the individual industry level for

some of the earlier findings, including Alpert's findings with respect to
concentration.

The next section briefly reviews the principal theoretical determinants
of the fringe share as developed in previous research. In addition to concen-
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tration, these include income, group size, the extent of unionization, and
efforts to reduce labor turnover in the face of rising turnover costs.
IL DETERMINANTS OF THE WAGE FRINGE MIX

Rising incomes may lead to the growth of fringe benefits for t
distinct reasons. First, if fringe benefits are normal goods and if they

have an income elasticity exceeding unity (as seems reasonable), the shar
total compensation taken in the form of fringe benefits will rise with
income. Second, the rising marginal tax rates on increased cash earnings
embodied in the progressive tax structure produce a gradual reduction as

earnings rise in the effective price of fringe benefits; they are typically
either untaxed (e.g., group health and life insurance premiums) or taxed only

on a deferred basis (e.g., pension contributions). This price effect should
result in a substitution of fringes for cash wages, thereby also increasing the
share of fringe benefits in total compensation.

The differential between the individual price and the group price for
many benefits also should encourage the growth of fringe benefits. As Rice
observes [ 14] , group prices tend to vary inversely with the size of the group

for which the purchase is made, suggesting that the effect of this price
differential may be captured empirically by a variable related to size.
Freeman provides several possible rationales for a positive impact of
unions on fringe benefit growth [4] . Stressing the political nature of unions,
he uses a median voter model in which the union represents the tastes of the

median rather than the marginal worker. Given that the median worker
likely is older and less mobile than the marginal worker, he/she presumably
has a greater demand for fringes. Freeman also notes that union wage
effects tend to result in increased job tenure and lower quit rates, which

increase the likelihood that workers actually will receive deferred fringes
such as nonvested pensions and life insurance benefits. This would tend to

increase the value of such benefits to union members. Finally, Freeman
stresses the role of the union as a credible source of information for employ-

1For further discussion, see [11, 20]. In their empirical work, Long

and Scott and Woodbury find the price effect more important than the
income effect. Alpert [2] , however, reaches the opposite conclusion.
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ees concerning benefits and as a transmitter of accurate information on
employee preferences to the employer.2

An alternative and purely economic analysis of the role of unions is
provided by Mincer [12] , who argues that unions push for a greater fringe
share as a way of protecting members from one of the adverse consequences

of demanding higher wages. According to Mincer, the well documented
tendency for unionized workers to obtain higher wages could be expected to
cause employers to reduce hours, thus limiting any gain in weekly earnings
arising from the increased wages. To blunt this response, unions attempt to
increase quasi-fixed costs, such as fringes, more rapidly than wages. Higher

fixed costs encourage employers to respond to rising wages with layoffs
rather than with reduced hours. Layoffs, Mincer says, are preferred by
unions because they imply a smaller loss of income than reduced hours, given

the existence of unemployment compensation and other unemployment
benefits.

It also has been generally recognized that deferred fringe benefits (and

other benefits that increase with tenure) may be used by employers as a
device for strengthening the attachment of employees to the firm, thereby
reducing turnover. As on the job training costs have increased, the costs of
turnover correspondingly have risen. Fringe benefits that tie workers to the

firm are a way of reducing such costs, and industries which have greater
investments in specific human capital reasonably may be expected to have
greater fringe shares.3

The possibility that product market power also may affect the fringe
share had not been considered prior to AlpertTs paper. Considerable research
has been devoted to the question, however, of whether product market power

affects hourly wage rates.4 Long and Linkfs recent findings show a positive
impact of product market power on annual fringe benefits [10] . Therefore,

2Lester [9] has uncovered data suggesting that employers tend to

underestimate the value placed on benefits by their employees.

3Some recent research suggests that fringe benefits, particularly
pension and health insurance plans, can be effective in discouraging

turnover. See [13].

4The results have been mixed. See [18, 6, 3, 7] .
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it is reasonable to look for a possible impact of product market power on the
fringe benefit share.

Alpert offers a variety of intuitive explanations why product market
power may affect the fringe share. He cites the Weiss argument that firms
in concentrated industries may pay higher wage rates "to buy public favor
and/or to limit union power" [18, p. 97] . He then states [2, pp. 183-184] :
If supplements are superior to money wages at
attaining these objectives, firms possessing market power may pay larger proportions of supplements, compensation constant, than firms without
market power. Another complementary rationale
for higher proportions of supplements being paid
by firms possessing market power is that such
firms may be relatively strong bargaining opponents, and hence they may act independently to
alter the composition of compensation so that
remuneration of a given market value to the
worker is less costly to the firm. Such a package
would contain a relatively large proportion of
wage supplements.

Although these explanations are speculative, they are buttressed by
Alpert's arguments for interaction between product market power and
unionization [2] . Market power and unionization may interact positively to
increase the proportion of fringe benefits in total compensation for either
of two reasons. First, both unions and firms may attempt to increase the

proportion of fringe benefits in the compensation package because the

market value of such a package will be higher. (This may be due to the
favorable tax treatment of fringe benefits.) Alternatively, the presence of
product market power may enhance the unioiVs ability to increase the
fringe share because firms in concentrated industries may be less resistant
to the demands of unions. This is because such firms tend to be more

profitable and also better able to pass on cost increases to their customers
than other firms. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the union

effect on the fringe share will be stronger in high concentration industrie

A variety of other factors have been recognized as potentially significant in explaining the incidence and growth of fringe benefits. For
example, various demographic characteristics of workers, such as age
distribution, sex, marital status, and number of dependents also may be
important. The four factors identified by Rice, however, have dominated
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subsequent research and discussion. Therefore, attention will be focused on
these factors and on market concentration in the empirical tests below.
IIL THE DATA AND VARIABLES

The principal sources of data are the Annual Survey of Manuf

and the Census of Manufacturers [16, 17] , which provide data by fo

industry on total labor costs (TLC). Total labor costs are broken do

the following three components: (1) Payroll (PAY), or the total wa

salaries paid; (2) Legally mandated fringe benefits (LMB), consi

marily of employer contributions for social security, unemploym

pensation, and workmanTs compensation; and (3) Nonmandated

benefits (NMB), those benefits paid for voluntarily by employ
other data used in this study are derived from these same sources.

Table 1 shows aggregate data on fringe benefit trends for the

U.S. manufacturing sector. Part A shows the three way breakdown
labor costs as described above for 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1981. Part B

shows the two way breakdown of total voluntary labor costs between payroll and nonmandated benefits for the same years. From these figures, it is
clear that the shares of both legally mandated and nonmandated benefits in
total labor costs have increased significantly over the period 1967-1981,
with the latter share nearly doubling.

The dependent variable FRINGE, which is calculated for both 1967

and 1977, is defined as NMB/(NMB + PAY), where NMB is nonmandated
benefits and PAY is payroll. The independent variables employed in this
study are defined as follows:

(1) COMP is the level of average annual compensation in the industry,

computed by dividing the sum of payroll (PAY) and nonmandated fringe
benefits (NMB) for the industry by total industry employment. This vari-

able is specific to the years 1967 or 1977, as appropriate. As in several
prior studies, this single variable is used to capture both the real income
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TABLE 1

Distribution of Total Labor Costs in U.S. Manufacturing
Percent of Total Labor Costs
1967 1972 1977 1981

Payroll 89.0 86.7 82.9 81.6
Legally Mandated
Benefits

4.7

5.2

6.6

7.2

Nonmandated

Benefits
Totals

6.3

100.0

8.1

100.0

10.5
100.0

Percent

11.2
100.0

of

Voluntary

L

1967 1972 1977 1981

Payroll 93.3 91.5 88.8 87.9
Nonmandated

Benefits
Totals

6.7

100.0

8.5

100.0

11.2
100.0

12.1
100.0

Source: data in Annual Survey
Census of Manufactures 1977
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[17]
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.
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5There are several difficulties
from the income effect in studies of this kind. Alpert uses as a separate
variable the federal marginal tax rate which would apply to a worker who
receives the industryTs average annual earnings and who uses the standard
deduction while claiming the average number of exemptions. Sources of
measurement error include: 1. use of an average income figure, which may
hide considerable variation in income and marginal tax rates among an
industry's workers; 2. failure to take into account state income taxes,
which vary widely; 3. failure to take into account other household income,
including spouses' income, which can vary considerably among industries and
will affect the marginal tax rates. Alpert recognizes that measurement
problems may explain why he did not find a sizable tax effect.
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su

result

in

benefits. This measure seems preferable to a measure of the average size
of establishments, which may be unduly sensitive to the presence of numerous small establishments in some industries.

(3) KLRATIO is the capital labor ratio, more specifically the ratio of
gross assets to employment for either 1967 or 1977. Following Long and
Scott, this measure serves as a proxy for potential turnover costs, since
more capital intensive industries are presumed to require a more highly
trained work force.

(4) UNION, for 1967, is the fraction of the industry!s employees
covered by collective bargaining agreements, from Freeman and Medoff
[5], These data relate to 1968-1972 and are available only on the three
digit level of aggregation. Therefore, each four digit industry in the
sample takes the value of the three digit industry group of which it is a
part. Since comparable data on unionization are not available for 1967 and

1977, it is necessary to use a different, albeit similar, measure for 1977.
For 1977, UNION is the fraction of the industry's employees who belonged
to unions averaged over the three years 1976-1978, from Kokkelenberg and
Sockell [8] . These data also are available at roughly the three digit level.
UNION is the only variable employed for which the data are not matched to

a Census four digit code. Consistent with previous studies, the union
fraction serves as a proxy for union power.

(5) CONC is the adjusted Census four firm concentration ratio,
defined as the proportion of total industry shipments accounted for by the
four largest sellers. Although the Census concentration ratio is the most
frequently used measure of product market power in empirical work, its
shortcomings are well known [ 15] . These problems may be reduced, ho w-

6 [11]. Capital intensity is probably not an ideal proxy for turnover

costs, but it seems the best alternative available.
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ever, by using adjusted figures from Weiss and Pascoe' which correct for
improper product market boundaries for the presence of regional and local
markets and for foreign trade. The concentration data originate in the
same source and are compiled on the same consistent four digit basis as are
all other data used in this study except the unionization data, thus ensuring
a high degree of comparability.

(6) INTER is an interaction term, the product of UNION and CONC.
The inclusion of an interaction term is consistent with earlier discussion

and will facilitate comparisons with Alpert.

The sample consists of all four digit manufacturing industries for
which the requisite data were available, except for those industries with
"miscellaneous" or "not elsewhere classified" in their titles. For 1967, the
sample consists of 208 industries. For 1977, the sample is reduced to 177

industries, primarily because data for the SIZE variable were lacking for a
number of industries included in the 1967 sample. For purposes of compar-

ison, results with this smaller sample will be presented for both 1967 and
1977.

IV. THE REGRESSION RESULTO

Equation 2-1 in Table 2 shows the results for 1967 for the 208 ind

try sample. The coefficient of determination (R2, adjusted for degrees

freedom) indicates that approximately two-thirds of the interindu
variation in the fringe share is explained by independent variables. The
coefficients on COMP, SIZE, and KLRATIO all have the expected signs and
are highly significant. The coefficients on CONC and UNION are negative,
but are not significantly different from zero. The coefficient on INTER is
positive and statistically significant. As is evidently the case in Álpert's

7See [19]. The Weiss Pascoe data are for 1972. The 1967 CONC

variable is the Weiss Pascoe measure multiplied by the ratio of the 1967 and
1972 official Census concentration ratios. The 1977 CONC variable is the

Weiss Pascoe measure multiplied by the ratio of the 1977 and 1972 official
Census concentration ratios. This procedure assumes that the appropriate
adjustments for 1967 and 1977 are proportional to the 1972 adjustment.
Given the high degree of stability of the official concentration ratios from
one Census year to another, this seems reasonable. For the sample, the
simple correlation between the 1967 and 1972 Census concentration ratios is
+0.96. The 1972-1977 correlation is +0.92.
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TABLE 2

Regression Equations Explaining the Fringe Share
1967 and 1977

Equation
Year

(2-1)

1967

Industries

(2-2)

1967

208

(2-3)

1977

177

177

Intercept 0.00316 0.00081 0.00211
(0.57) (0.14) (0.24)
COMP 0.00508** 0.00564** 0.00442**

(7.92) (7.98) (8.65)
SIZE 0.02200** 0.02029** 0.02596**

(6.86) (5.50) (4.59)
KLRATIO 0.00013** 0.00006 -0.00003

(2.36) (0.98) (-0.57)
UNION -0.00092 -0.00029 0.02821

(-0.09) (-0.03) (1.32)

CONC -0.00201 -0.00117 0.02429

(-0.18) (-0.10) (1.33)

INTER 0.05031* 0.04842* 0.04164

(2.28) (2.02) (0.89)

R2

0.66

F-ratio

0.66

67.06

0.73

56.69

78.58

t-values in parentheses
»statistically significant at .95
»♦statistically significant at .99

study
1

may

also,
be

the

separate

obscured

by

effects

multicoll

between UNION and INTER and between CONC and INTER are +0.67 and
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Q

+0.76, respectively. Overall, however, the regression results clearly
suggest that product market power and unionization interact positively to
raise the fringe share.

Equation 2-2 in Table 2 also shows results for 1967, but for the
smaller 1977 sample. The results are similar to those portrayed in equation
2-1, except KLRATIO ceases to be statistically significant. The perform-

ance of KLRATIO in the regression equation is sensitive to the exact
composition of the sample.
The results for 1977 are shown in equation 2-3. The overall level of

explanation is even higher than that obtained for 1967, with the adjusted

R2 climbing to 0.73. In general, the coefficients of determination in the
study compare favorably with the maximum R2 obtained by Alpert of 0.43
[2]. This improvement can be attributed primarily to measurement of the
different variables on a consistent and comparable basis at the appropriate

level of aggregation.9 For 1977, the coefficients on COMP and SIZE continue to be positive and highly significant, while KLRATIO is again insignif-

icant for this sample. The UNION, CONC, and INTER variables show
positive, but statistically insignificant, coefficients. The fact that all
three variables are insignificant, however, appears to be due to multicollinearity. The quantitative impact of concentration and unionization on the
fringe share is similar in 1967 and 1977, with these variables jointly producing a strong positive effect both years.

Although all of the independent variables, with the possible exception

of KLRATIO, appear to explain partially the share of fringe benefits in
Q

°Other correlations among the independent variables may also be of

interest. The simple correlation matrix for the 208 industry sample is:

FRINGE 1.00
COMP 0.66 1.00
SIZE 0.58 0.38 1.00
KLRATIO 0.36 0.34 0.06 1.00
UNION 0.34 0.20 0.06 0.28 1.00
CONC 0.55 0.40 0.43 0.22 0.12 1.00
INTER 0.61 0.38 0.34 0.33 0.67 0.76 1.00

FRINGE COMP SIZE KLRATIO UNION CONC INTER

While simple correlations are not decisive, these figures d
other serious problems with multicollinearity.
Experiments with the official Census concentration ratios suggest
that the use of adjusted ratios is not a major source of the improvement.
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total compensation, it is important also to consider the quantitative magnitudes of their effects. The coefficients on COMP are fairly stable across
the three equations in Table 2 and indicate that this variable has a sizable
effect, with each $1000 increase in income raising the fringe share by
roughly one-half a percentage point. Using equation 2-1 to illustrate, an

increase in COMP from its approximate 1967 mean value of $7000 to
$8000, with all other variables held constant at their means, would result in
an approximate increase in the fringe share from .058 to .063.
For SIZE, the coefficients are also relatively stable and indicate that
each ten percentage point rise in the proportion of an industryTs employees

who are employed in large plants leads to an increase in the fringe share of
roughly two-tenths of a percentage point. At the extreme, an industry with

nothing but large plants would have a fringe share more than two full
percentage points higher than an industry with no large plants. Given the

magnitude of the fringe share in 1967 and 1977 (with means of
approximately six and ten percent, respectively), this is a fairly noticeable
effect.

It is difficult to generalize on the quantitative impact of KLRATIO,
given the instability of its coefficients across the equations of Table 2. It
appears to be less important than either COMP or SIZE.
The specifications of the equations in Table 2 imply that the quantitative impact of unionization will vary with the level of concentration and

vice versa. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the effects of these
variables jointly. The combined effects are illustrated in Tables 3 and 4,

which show the results of using equations 2-1 and 2-3, respectively, of
Table 2 to calculate the value of the fringe share for various levels of union
coverage/membership and concentration, with other variables held constant
at their mean values. In both tables, the results are approximately sym-

metrical with respect to unionization and concentration. Rising unionization appears to have a larger positive impact on the fringe share in high
concentration industries that it does in low concentration industries, while

the impact of rising concentration also appears to be greater when unionization is high. Together, concentration and unionization appear to have an
important impact.

In 1967 (Table 3), an industry for which UNION and CONC are both 80
percent would have a fringe share of .079, 55 percent higher than the share

of .051 for an industry for which both variables are 20 percent. In 1977
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TABLE 3

Fringe Share for Various Levels

of Union Coverage and Concentration. 1967

Concentration Union Coverage (Percentage)

Percentage

20

40

60

80

100

20

.051

.052

.054

.056

.058

40

.052

.056

.060

.064

.067

60

.054

.060

.066

.071

.077

80

.055

.063

.071

.079

.087

100

.057

.067

.077

.087

.097

Source: Computed
COMP, SIZE, and KLRATIO

using

Equ

TABLE 4

Fringe Share for Various Levels of Union Membership
and Concentration, 1977

Concentration Union Membership (Percentage)

Percentage

20

40

60

80

100

20

.087

.094

.102

.109

.116

40

.093

.102

.111

.120

.129

60

.100

.111

.121

.132

.142

80

.106

.119

.131

.143

.156

100

.113

.127

.141

.155

Source: Computed
COMP, SIZE, and KLRATIO

.169

using
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Equ

(Table 4), an industry for which UNION and CONC are both 80 percent
would have a fringe share of .143, 64 percent higher than the share of .087
for an industry for which both variables are 20 percent. Concentration and
unionization appear to have strong effects on the fringe share in both 1967
and 1977,10 although interactive effects are less pronounced in 1977.
V. CONCLUSIONS

Cross section regression results for a large sample of four digit

manufacturing industries corroborate at the individual industry level ear

findings indicating that the share of fringe benefits in total compensatio

affected positively by higher income and employer size. The results wit

turnover costs were mixed which may be due to the fact that capital in

sity is not an ideal indicator of the importance of turnover costs. The m

important finding is that unionization and concentration together prod

strong, positive effects on the fringe share. This finding should be of s
interest to policy makers in the fields of antitrust and taxation.

This is only the second study to investigate the possible impact

product market power on the fringe share. Use of an alternative data se

in regression analysis resulted in much higher coefficients of determinat

than were found in AlpertTs study. This apparently is due to the fact t
the alternative data set allows for better data comparability among the

variables employed, while also allowing for the empirical work to be
carried out at the four digit level of aggregation . This suggests that these
matters should be given greater consideration in future research.

10It must be recognized that the 1967 and 1977 results are not

precisely comparable, since the 1967 UNION measure is based on coverage,
while the 1977 UNION measure is based on membership.
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